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The Open Finance Brasil Initial Structure is responsible for creating standards and specifications necessary to meet the requirements and obligations of the Brasil Open Finance Legislation as originally outlined by the Brasil Central Bank. There is a possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject to patent rights. OFBIS shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

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RFC8705 - OAuth 2.0 Mutual TLS Client Authentication and Certificate Bound Access Tokens

JARM - Financial-grade API: JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)

PAR - OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests

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Brasil Open Finance ecosystem leverages a federation trust provider or directory of participants as the golden source of information on accredited participants and software that are authorized to partake in the Open Finance Brasil ecosystem.

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It's important to remember that the client registration payload has most of its attributes as non-mandatory, and that assigned values that conflict with those in the software statement assertion will be overridden by the values of the software statement assertion issued by the Directory of Participants. Not all metadata a client wishes to provide may be contained in a software statement, e.g alternative Metadata Languages and Script values. There are some cases where the client metadata are subset of the existing values in the SSA, such as redirect_URIs.

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shall advertise its presence in the Open Finance Brasil ecosystem by being listed on the Directory of Participants;
shall advertise all Open Finance Brasil REST API resources protected by the OpenID Provider on the Directory of Participants;
shall advertise support for all signing, encryption, authentication mechanisms and standards required to support Open Finance Brasil Financial API;
shall advertise support for OpenID Dynamic Client Registration;
may advertise mtls_endpoint_aliases as per clause 5 RFC 8705 OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens the token_endpoint, registration_endpoint and , userinfo_endpoint ;if supporting OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests shall advertise through OIDD mtls_endpoint_aliases the pushed_and push_authorization_request_endpoint;
if supporting Financial API - Client Initiated Back Channel Authentication shall advertise through OIDD mtls_endpoint_aliases the backchannel_authentication_endpoint;
shall not rotate the registration_access_token.

6.2. Client

The Client shall support OpenID Connect Discovery as required by Financial-grade API Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline

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shall rely on ecosystem discovery services provided by Directory of Participants only;
shall derive necessary Authorisation Server metadata by relying on an Authorization Servers OpenID Connect Discovery services only;
where present, shall use endpoints advertised in mtls_endpoint_aliases as per clause 5 RFC 8705 OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens;

7. Open Finance Brasil OpenID Connect Registration Provisions

7.1. Authorization server

The Authorization Server shall support the RFC RFCs Dynamic Client Registration (DCR) RFC7591, Dynamic Client Management (DCM) RFC7592 and OpenID Registration

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shall reject dynamic client registration requests not performed over a connection secured with mutual tls using certificates issued by Brazil ICP (production) or the Directory of Participants (sandbox);
shall validate that the request contains software_statement JWT signed using the PS256 algorithim issued by the Open Finance Brasil directory of participants;
shall validate that the software_statement was issued (iat) not more than 5 minutes prior to the request being received;
shall validate that the attribute jwks (key set by value) was not included; but declared as a reference in the jwks_uri attribute;
shall, when informed, validate that jwks_uri matches the software_jwks_uri provided in the software_statement;
1. shall validate if the content obtained through jwks_uri contains a certificate of type use: “enc”;
shall require and validate that redirect_uris matches or contains a sub set of software_redirect_uris provided in the software_statement;
shall require and validate that all client authentication mechanism adhere to the requirements defined in RFC7591 and RFC7592, validating the registration_access_token and, through a secure connection, the certificate chain of ICP-Brasil;
removed;
shall validate that the requested scopes are adequate for accredited institutions and their regulatory roles and contained in the software_statement. The list of regulatory permissions and the corresponding scopes are described in the following sections;
where possible, shall compare client metadata asserted by a client to the metadata provided in the software_statement, choosing values in the SSA with precedence;
shall accept all x.500 AttributeType name strings defined in the Distinguished Name of the x.509 Certificate Profiles defined in Open Finance Brasil x.509 Certificate Standards;
if supporting tls_client_auth client authentication mechanism as defined in RFC8705 shall only accept tls_client_auth_subject_dn as an indication of the certificate subject value as defined in clause 2.1.2 RFC8705;
The value of the field The value of the field UID of the certificate should match the one sent in the SSA, where the UID field should contain the value of the software_id field of the SSA.
The organizationIdentifier field will be found in the subject_DN in ASN.1 format and must be decoded respecting the corresponding encoding string. The value of the organizationIdentifier field of the certificate which must contain the prefix corresponding to the Registration Reference OFBBR- followed by the value of the org_id field of the SSA. You must convert the values of the OID 2.5.4.97 field from ASN.1 format to human-readable text. For certificates issued before August 31, 2022: The value of the OR field of the certificate must contain the value of the org_id field of the SSA.
shall, during the TLS handshake process, use the distinguishedNameMatch rule to compare the DN values as defined in RFC4517.
shall ensure the integrity of the stock of active consents, even after any systemic changes, so that such changes are transparent to the data receiver institutions (TPP).
shall perform a recertification on OIDF FAPI and DCR after any systemic changes.
The value of the software_api_webhook_uris attribute contained as an attribute in the JWS in software_statement must be compared with the webhook_uris field. If the values are not exactly the same, the error must be returned, with the HTTP status code set to 400, error filled in as invalid_webhook_uris and error_description filled in with The content of the webhook_uris field different from what was Registered in the software_statement noted via the JWS software_api_webhook_uris field.
If the webhook_uris field is not declared in the payload, the webhook functionality shall be considered disabled for the specific client.

These provisions apply equally to the processing of RFC7591, RFC7592 and OpenID Registration requests

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Whenever properties of a DCR request are not included nor mandatory in the specification, the Authorisation Server shall apply client defaults in the following manner:

shall select and apply the encryption algorithm and cipher choice from the most recommended of the IANA cipher suites that is supported by the Authorisation Server;
shall populate defaults from values within the software_statement assertion where possible;
shall grant the client permission to the shall, during the TLS handshake process, use the distinguishedNameMatch rule to compare the DN values as defined in RFC4517.
shall ensure the integrity of the stock of active consents, even after any systemic changes, so that such changes are transparent to the data receiver institutions (TPP).
shall perform a recertification on OIDF FAPI and DCR after any systemic changes.
The value of the software_api_webhook_uris attribute contained as an attribute in the JWS in software_statement must be compared with the webhook_uris field. If the values are not exactly the same, the error must be returned, with the HTTP status code set to 400, error filled in as invalid_webhook_uris and error_description filled in with The content of the webhook_uris field different from what was Registered in the software_statement noted via the JWS software_api_webhook_uris field.
If the webhook_uris field is not declared in the payload, the webhook functionality shall be considered disabled for the specific client.

These provisions apply equally to the processing of RFC7591, RFC7592 and OpenID Registration requests

7.1.1. Applying Server Defaults

Whenever properties of a DCR request are not included nor mandatory in the specification, the Authorisation Server shall apply client defaults in the following manner:

shall select and apply the encryption algorithm and cipher choice from the most recommended of the IANA cipher suites that is supported by the Authorisation Server;
shall populate defaults from values within the software_statement assertion where possible;
shall grant the client permission to the complete set of potential scopes based on the softwares regulatory permissions included in the software_statement;

7.2. Regulatory Roles for OpenID and OAuth 2.0 Mappings

To participate in the Open Finance ecosystem, accredited institutions must register themselves in the directory of participants according to their regulatory roles. Those roles reflect the institutions authorization from the Central Bank and, consequently, the APIs they are allowed to use.

The following table describes the regulatory roles for Open Finance and the related OAuth 2.0 scopes mapping. If the scopes are omitted during the DCR process, the authorization server shall grant the complete set of potential scopes based on the

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7.1.2. Certificate Distinguished Name Parsing

Clause 3 of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names defines the mandatory OIDs whose AttributeType strings (descriptors) must be recognized by implementers. This mandatory list does not include several of the OIDs defined in Open Finance Brasil x.509 Certificate Standards nor is there a defined mechanism for Authorisation Servers to publish information regarding the format that they would expect a Dynamic Client Registration request that includes a tls_client_auth_subject_dn to be presented in.

To address this ambiguity, the Authorization Server shall accept only the AttributeTypes (descriptors) defined in the last paragraph of clause 3 RFC4514 in string format, it shall also accept in OID format, with their values in ASN.1, all the AttributeTypes defined in Distinguished Name Open Finance Brasil x.509 Certificate Standards or added by the Certificate Authority.

In case of non-compliance with these requirements, the Authorization Server shall reject the registration.

In terms of format, follow below how decoding should be done:

Obtain in reverse order the certificate attributes.
Append each RDN (RelativeDistinguishedName) segment with a comma ','.
Use the RFC strings (CN, L, ST, O, OR, C, Street, DC, UID) with the value of their attributes in human-readable format.
Use the OIDs of the attributes defined in this specification for use in the OFB (businessCategory = OID 2.5.4.15, jurisdictionCountryName = OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3, serialNumber = OID 2.5.4.5, organizationIdentifier = OID 2.5.4.97) with values in ASN.1 format, following the RFC4514, being that:
- Attribute names shall be defined according to dot-decimal notation, without adding the prefix "OID", ie. "2.5.4.15", followed by ('=#') plus the hexadecimal value of the attribute, here follows a complete example: 2.5.4.15=#0C1450726976617465204F7267616E697A6174696F6E
- There are no restrictions for encoding and formatting attribute values. The hexadecimal value presented on the utilized attribute must be respected (PrintableString, UTF8String, etc). This item complies with opcionality of the format stabilished by the AC face ICP normatives and items 2.3, 2.4 e 5.2 of the RFC4514. -To comply with DCR standard, convert ASN.1 values from OID 2.5.4.97 organizationIdentifier to human readable text, use features of your API gateway or a standard library of type ASN.1 or if necessary still develop manually. To do so, retrieve the full value of the OID 2.5.4.97 contained in the subject_DN. Remove dot-decimal notation (2.5.4.97). Remove the ('=#') signs. Convert the hex value to text. Apply a filter using regular expression to retrieve the org_id after ('OFBBR-'), for example: 2.5.4.97=#132A4F464242522D36376335373838322D303433622D313165632D396130332D303234326163313330303033. Remove dot-decimal notation and signs ('=#'): 2.5.4.97=#. Convert the hexadecimal value 132A4F464242522D36376335373838322D303433622D313165632D396130332D303234326163313330303033 to text: **OFBBR-67c57882-043b-031ec Apply the regular expression and retrieve the org_id that is contained after 'OFBBR-':67c57882-043b-11ec-9a03-0242ac130003.

Below are examples of required attributes for CAs active until August 31, 2022:

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ubject_dn

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Issuer

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UID=67c57882-043b-11ec-9a03-0242ac130003,1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=#13024252,2.5.4.15=#131450726976617465204f7267616e697a6174696f6e,2.5.4.5=#130e3133333533323336303030313839,CN=mycn.bank.gov.br,OU=497e1ffe-b2a2-4a4e-8ef0-70633fd11b59,O=My Public Bank,L=BRASILIA,ST=DF,C=BR

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issuer=CN=Open Banking SANDBOX Issuing CA - G1,OU=Open Banking,O=Open Banking Brasil,C=BR

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UID=67c57882-043b-11ec-9a03-0242ac130003,1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=#13024252,2.5.4.15=#0C0F427573696E65737320456E74697479,CN=mycn.bank.gov.br,2.5.4.5=#130e3133333533323336303030313839,OU=497e1ffe-b2a2-4a4e-8ef0-70633fd11b59,O=My Public Bank,L=BRASILIA,ST=DF,C=BR

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issuer=CN=Autoridade Certificadora do SERPRO SSLv1,OU=Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira v10,O=ICP-Brasil,C=BR

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1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=#13024252,2.5.4.15=#131450726976617465204f7267616e697a6174696f6e,UID=67c57882-043b-11ec-9a03-0242ac130003,CN=openbanking.mybank.com.br,2.5.4.5=#130e3133333533323336303030313839,OU=497e1ffe-b2a2-4a4e-8ef0-70633fd11b59,L=Goiania,ST=GO,O=MyBank SA,C=BR

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issuer=CN=AC SOLUTI SSL EV,OU=Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira v10,O=ICP-Brasil,C=BR

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CN=mycn.bank.com.br,UID=67c57882-043b-11ec-9a03-0242ac130003,OU=497e1ffe-b2a2-4a4e-8ef0-70633fd11b59,L=Sao Paulo,ST=SP,O=MyBank SA,C=BR,2.5.4.5=#130e3133333533323336303030313839,1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=#13024252,2.5.4.15=#0C0F427573696E65737320456E74697479

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issuer=CN=AC SERASA SSL EV,OU=Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira v10,O=ICP-Brasil,C=BR

Below are examples of required attributes for CAs active after August 31, 2022:

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subject_dn

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Issuer

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UID=67c57882-043b-11ec-9a03-0242ac130003,2.5.4.97=#0C2A4F464242522D36376335373838322D303433622D313165632D396130332D303234326163313330303033,1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=#13024252,2.5.4.15=#131450726976617465204f7267616e697a6174696f6e,2.5.4.5=#130e3133333533323336303030313839,CN=mycn.bank.gov.br,OU=497e1ffe-b2a2-4a4e-8ef0-70633fd11b59,O=My Public Bank,L=BRASILIA,ST=DF,C=BR

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issuer=CN=AC SERASA SSL EV,OU=Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira v10,O=ICP-Brasil,C=BR

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UID=67c57882-043b-11ec-9a03-0242ac130003,1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=#13024252,2.5.4.15=#131450726976617465204f7267616e697a6174696f6e,CN=mycn.bank.gov.br,2.5.4.5=#130e3133333533323336303030313839,2.5.4.97=#132A4F464242522D36376335373838322D303433622D313165632D396130332D303234326163313330303033,O=My Public Bank,L=BRASILIA,ST=DF,C=BR

7.2. Regulatory Roles for OpenID and OAuth 2.0 Mappings

To participate in the Open Finance ecosystem, accredited institutions must register themselves in the directory of participants according to their regulatory roles. Those roles reflect the institutions authorization from the Central Bank and, consequently, the APIs they are allowed to use.

The following table describes the regulatory roles for Open Finance and the related OAuth 2.0 scopes mapping. If the scopes are omitted during the DCR process, the authorization server shall grant the complete set of potential scopes based on the registering bank's regulatory roles, as described in the Server Defaults section.

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Regulatory Role

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Description

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Allowed Scopes

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Target Phase

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DADOS

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Instituição transmissora ou receptora de dados (AISP)

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openid

accounts

credit-cards-accounts

consents

customers

invoice-financings

financings

loans

unarranged-accounts-overdraft

resources

credit-fixed-incomes

exchanges

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Phase 2 and Phase 4

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PAGTO

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Instituição prestadora de serviço de iniciação de pagamentos (PISP)

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openid

payments

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Phase 3

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CONTA

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Instituição detentora de conta (ASPSP)

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openid

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Phase 3

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CCORR

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Correspondente de crédito

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openid

...

Phase 3*

It is requiread that the active roles in the application's software_statement are validated. The field _software_statement_roles shall be used for validation and currently listed roles shall be active.

7.3. Client Registration

Section 4.2.11 of RFC 4517 (caseIgnoreMatch) must be respected. Upon registering using the tls_client_auth authentication method, the client shall forward the tls_client_auth_subject_dn field with the AttibuteTypes(Descriptors) using the defined format under item Certificate Distinguished Name Parsing. Non adherence to this format shall cause rejection of the registration.

8. Software Statement Assertion

A Software Statement Assertion (software_statement) is a JSON Web Token (JWT) RFC7519 that asserts the metadata values of the client software as a whole. On the Open Finance Brasil structure, this software_statement is signed by the Participants Directory and it's signature MUST be validated by the Authorization Servers using the public keys available on the following session.

8.1. Attributes of the Software Statement Assertion (Claims)

The following example contains all attributes currently included in a software_statement:

Bloco de código

{
  "software_mode": "Live",
  "software_redirect_uris": [
    "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting/cb"
  ],
  "software_api_webhook_uris": ["https://www.myitp.com/mykong3"],
  "software_statement_roles": [
    {
      "role": "DADOS",
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "status": "Active"
    },
    {
      "role": "PAGTO",
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "status": "Active"
    }
  ],
  "software_client_name": "Raidiam Accounting",
  "org_status": "Active",
  "software_client_id": "Cki1EbvjwyhPB12NGLlz2",
  "iss": "Open Banking Open Banking Brasil prod SSA issuer",
  "software_tos_uri": "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting/tos.html",
  "software_client_description": "Raidiam Accounting leverage cutting edge open banking access to bring you real time up to date views of your finances",
  "software_jwks_uri": "https://keystore.directory.openbankingbrasil.org.br/b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d/25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de/application.jwks",
  "software_policy_uri": "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting/policy.html",
  "software_id": "25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de",
  "software_client_uri": "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting.html",
  "software_jwks_inactive_uri": "https://keystore.directory.openbankingbrasil.org.br/b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d/25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de/inactive/application.jwks",
  "software_jwks_transport_inactive_uri": "https://keystore.directory.openbankingbrasil.org.br/b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d/25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de/inactive/transport.jwks",
  "software_jwks_transport_uri": "https://keystore.directory.openbankingbrasil.org.br/b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d/25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de/transport.jwks",
  "software_logo_uri": "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting/logo.png",
  "org_id": "b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d",
  "org_number": "112233445566",
  "software_environment": "production",
  "software_version": "1.1",
  "software_roles": [
    "DADOS",
    "PAGTO"
  ],
  "org_name": "Open Banking Brasil",
  "iat": 1620060821,
  "organisation_competent_authority_claims": [
    {
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "authorisations": [],
      "registration_id": "13353236-OBB-CONTA",
      "authority_id": "687a1c94-b360-4e04-9589-0fa5cb16451b",
      "authority_name": "Banco Central",
      "authorisation_role": "CONTA",
      "authority_code": "BCB",
      "status": "Active"
    },
    {
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "authorisations": [],
      "registration_id": "13353236-OBB-DADOS",
      "authority_id": "687a1c94-b360-4e04-9589-0fa5cb16451b",
      "authority_name": "Banco Central",
      "authorisation_role": "DADOS",
      "authority_code": "BCB",
      "status": "Active"
    },
    {
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "authorisations": [],
      "registration_id": "13353236-OBB-PAGTO",
      "authority_id": "687a1c94-b360-4e04-9589-0fa5cb16451b",
      "authority_name": "Banco Central",
      "authorisation_role": "PAGTO",
      "authority_code": "BCB",
      "status": "Active"
    }
  ]
}

9. Processing of the Dynamic Client Registration claim

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The steps of the subject_DN extraction process are described in section Certificate Distinguished Name Parsing

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The following is an example of Javascript code for extracting the subject_DN and the respective certificate teste.pem used in this example.

Bloco de código

const {X509Certificate} = require('crypto')
const fs = require('fs')

const x509 = new X509Certificate(fs.readFileSync('teste.pem'))
const sub = x509.subject
var array = sub.split(/\r?\n|\r|\n/g)

function hexa(x){
        var res = ''
        for (var i=0; i < x.length ; i++) { res += x.charCodeAt(i).toString(16) }
        return res
}

function retornaMatch(palavra, filtro){
        let match = palavra.match(filtro)
        if(match){ return match[0] }
}

var array1 = /organizationIdentifier=[o|O][f|F][b|B]{2}[r|R][-].*[,]/
var novaArray1 = retornaMatch(String(array),array1)
novaArray1 = String(novaArray1).split('=')
novaArray1[1] = novaArray1[1].replace(/,(\s+)?$/, '')

var array2 = /jurisdictionC=[a-z|A-Z]{2},/
var novaArray2 = retornaMatch(String(array),array2)
novaArray2 = String(novaArray2).split('=')
novaArray2[1] = novaArray2[1].replace(/,(\s+)?$/, '')

var array3 = /businessCategory=\w+\s\w+,/
var novaArray3 = retornaMatch(String(array),array3)
novaArray3 = String(novaArray3).split('=')
novaArray3[1] = novaArray3[1].replace(/,(\s+)?$/, '')

var array4 = /serialNumber=[0-9]{14},/
var novaArray4 = retornaMatch(String(array),array4)
novaArray4 = String(novaArray4).split('=')
novaArray4[1] = novaArray4[1].replace(/,(\s+)?$/, '')

function parseX509(array, encode){
        var tam = array.length-1
        var novaArray = []

        novaArray[0] = array[tam]
        novaArray[1] = '2.5.4.97=' +encode +'2A' + hexa(novaArray1[1])
        novaArray[2] = '1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=' +encode +'02' + hexa(novaArray2[1])
        novaArray[3] = '2.5.4.15=' +encode +'14' + hexa(novaArray3[1])
        novaArray[4] = '2.5.4.5=' +encode +'0E' + hexa(novaArray4[1])
        novaArray[5] = array[tam-5]
        novaArray[6] = array[tam-6]
        novaArray[7] = array[tam-7]
        novaArray[8] = array[tam-8]
        novaArray[9] = array[tam-9]

        var res = 'subject='
        for(i=0; i < novaArray.length ; i++){
                res += novaArray[i]
                res += ','
        }
        res = res.replace(/,(\s+)?$/, '')

        return res
}

console.log('Suject DN em Printable String: ', parseX509(array, '#13'))
console.log('Suject DN em UTF-8: ', parseX509(array, '#0C'))

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registering bank's regulatory roles, as described in the Server Defaults section.

Regulatory Role	Description	Allowed Scopes	Target Phase
DADOS	Instituição transmissora ou receptora de dados (AISP)	openid accounts credit-cards-accounts consents customers invoice-financings financings loans unarranged-accounts-overdraft resources credit-fixed-incomes exchanges bank-fixed-incomes variable-incomes treasure-titles funds	Phase 2 and Phase 4
PAGTO	Instituição prestadora de serviço de iniciação de pagamentos (PISP)	openid payments recurringPayments	Phase 3
CONTA	Instituição detentora de conta (ASPSP)	openid	Phase 3
CCORR	Correspondente de crédito	openid	Phase 3*

It is requiread that the active roles in the application's software_statement are validated. The field _software_statement_roles shall be used for validation and currently listed roles shall be active.

8. Software Statement Assertion

A Software Statement Assertion (software_statement) is a JSON Web Token (JWT) RFC7519 that asserts the metadata values of the client software as a whole. On the Open Finance Brasil structure, this software_statement is signed by the Participants Directory and it's signature MUST be validated by the Authorization Servers using the public keys available on the following session.

8.1. Attributes of the Software Statement Assertion (Claims)

The following example contains all attributes currently included in a software_statement:

Bloco de código

{
  "software_mode": "Live",
  "software_redirect_uris": [
    "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting/cb"
  ],
  "software_api_webhook_uris": ["https://www.myitp.com/mykong3"],
  "software_statement_roles": [
    {
      "role": "DADOS",
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "status": "Active"
    },
    {
      "role": "PAGTO",
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "status": "Active"
    }
  ],
  "software_client_name": "Raidiam Accounting",
  "org_status": "Active",
  "software_client_id": "Cki1EbvjwyhPB12NGLlz2",
  "iss": "Open Banking Open Banking Brasil prod SSA issuer",
  "software_tos_uri": "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting/tos.html",
  "software_client_description": "Raidiam Accounting leverage cutting edge open banking access to bring you real time up to date views of your finances",
  "software_jwks_uri": "https://keystore.directory.openbankingbrasil.org.br/b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d/25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de/application.jwks",
  "software_policy_uri": "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting/policy.html",
  "software_id": "25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de",
  "software_client_uri": "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting.html",
  "software_jwks_inactive_uri": "https://keystore.directory.openbankingbrasil.org.br/b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d/25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de/inactive/application.jwks",
  "software_jwks_transport_inactive_uri": "https://keystore.directory.openbankingbrasil.org.br/b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d/25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de/inactive/transport.jwks",
  "software_jwks_transport_uri": "https://keystore.directory.openbankingbrasil.org.br/b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d/25556d5a-b9dd-4e27-aa1a-cce732fe74de/transport.jwks",
  "software_logo_uri": "https://www.raidiam.com/accounting/logo.png",
  "org_id": "b961c4eb-509d-4edf-afeb-35642b38185d",
  "org_number": "112233445566",
  "software_environment": "production",
  "software_version": "1.1",
  "software_roles": [
    "DADOS",
    "PAGTO"
  ],
  "org_name": "Open Banking Brasil",
  "iat": 1620060821,
  "origin":["https://www.origem-1.com.br","https://www.origem-2.com.br","android:apk-key-hash:AbCdEf123456"],
  "organisation_competent_authority_claims": [
    {
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "authorisations": [],
      "registration_id": "13353236-OBB-CONTA",
      "authority_id": "687a1c94-b360-4e04-9589-0fa5cb16451b",
      "authority_name": "Banco Central",
      "authorisation_role": "CONTA"
      "authority_code": "BCB",
      "status": "Active"
    },
    {
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "authorisations": [],
      "registration_id": "13353236-OBB-DADOS",
      "authority_id": "687a1c94-b360-4e04-9589-0fa5cb16451b",
      "authority_name": "Banco Central",
      "authorisation_role": "DADOS",
      "authority_code": "BCB",
      "status": "Active"
    },
    {
      "authorisation_domain": "Open Banking",
      "authorisations": [],
      "registration_id": "13353236-OBB-PAGTO",
      "authority_id": "687a1c94-b360-4e04-9589-0fa5cb16451b",
      "authority_name": "Banco Central",
      "authorisation_role": "PAGTO",
      "authority_code": "BCB",
      "status": "Active"
    }
  ]
}

9. Processing of the Dynamic Client Registration claim

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9.1. Sending a Registration Claim with a Software Statement

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The following links point to public keys of the Participant Directory and must be used to verify the signature validity of the software_statements presented during the client registration process.

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Open Finance Open Finance Brasil sandbox SSA issuer

9.3. About authentication and authorization mechanisms for DCR and DCM services

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As they are auxiliary services to the main flow of Open Finance Brasil, the dynamic registration and maintenance services for clients do not use the same access control mechanisms. For example, it is not possible to require an OAuth 2.0 access_token from a client application that isn't registered yet with the transmitting institution.
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validate that the certificate presented by the client application is subordinate to the ICP-Brasil chains defined in the Open Finance Brasil Certificates Standard;As long as there is a need for the coexistence period (mentioned in section 7.1), validation must be implemented for both cases: certificates that have the value org_id in the organizationUnitName field (OU) and certificates that have the value org_id in the organizationIdentifier field.in the Open Finance Brasil Certificates Standard;
ensure that the signature of the software_statement_ presented by the client application during registration has been made by the Directory of Participants using the public keys described in the previous section;
ensure that the software_statement presented by the client application during registration corresponds to the same institution as the client certificate presented, validating it through the attributes that bring organization_id in the X.509 certificate.
Multiple DCR registrations for the same Software Statement should not be allowed, in a way that in case of a new registration attempt for an already registered Software Statement, the Error Response procedure defined on item 3.2.2 of the RFC7591 must be enforced.
issue, on the registry response, a registration_access_token to be used as an authentication token on maintaining operations of the registered client application, following specifications described in RFC7592.

9.3.2. Client Maintenance - GET /register - PUT /register - DELETE /register

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Validate the presence and matching of the Bearer header Authorization containing the value of the registration_access_token attribute returned during registration of the corresponding client.
When the invoked method is PUT / register, carry out the validations of sub-items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 5 of item Client registration - POST /register.
When the invoked method is GET /register, carry out the validations of sub-items 1 and 6 5 of item Client registration - POST /register.
When the invoked method is DELETE /register, carry out the validation of sub-item 1 of item Client registration - POST /register.
Note: RFC7592 provides the possibility of rotating the `registration_access_token` issued by the Authorization Server with each use, making it a single-use token. When registering their client applications, institutions should consider this aspect to receive and update the `registration_access_token` for the new value received in client maintenance (DCM) operations.

9.4. Signature certificates validation

The directory uses cert rescan function hourly to validation process.
The organization shall ensure that the validation process was completed.
Each organization must have a continuity plan in case of unavailability validation service.
If the signature certificate is not valid because it has a revoked status according to the CA’s OCSP/CRL issuer, or is inactive in the directory register, the set of public keys is moved to the inactive key storage.
The validation process should include:
- Resource server (Data Transmitter) message signature validation, to be done by the Client (Data Receiver)
  - Validate that the message was signed in line with what’s defined on the Message Signature Guidelines, including that the iss is equal to the organisation_id of the server that issued the message.
  - Fetch the “iss” claim from the JWT and build the directory application JWKS uri for that specific server.
  - Make sure that the kid present on the message JWT header is present on the directory JWKS.
  - Validate that the private key for the corresponding kid is able to validate the message signature.
- Client (Data Receiver) message signature validation, to be done by the Resource Server
  - Validate how the message was signed in line with what’s defined on the Message Signature Guidelines.
  - Obtain the org_jwks_uri which was presented on the SSA by the client on the moment of the registration (DCR)
  - Make sure that the kid present on the message JWT header is present on the directory JWKS.
  - Validate that the private key for the corresponding kid is able to validate the message signature.

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Bloco de código

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Author's Address

OFBIS GT Security

Open Finance Brasil Initial Structure

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Versões comparadas

Versão antiga 19

Nova versão Atual

Chave

6.2. Client

7. Open Finance Brasil OpenID Connect Registration Provisions

7.1. Authorization server

7.1.1. Applying Server Defaults

7.2. Regulatory Roles for OpenID and OAuth 2.0 Mappings

7.1.2. Certificate Distinguished Name Parsing

7.2. Regulatory Roles for OpenID and OAuth 2.0 Mappings

7.3. Client Registration

8. Software Statement Assertion

8.1. Attributes of the Software Statement Assertion (Claims)

9. Processing of the Dynamic Client Registration claim

8. Software Statement Assertion

8.1. Attributes of the Software Statement Assertion (Claims)

9. Processing of the Dynamic Client Registration claim

9.1. Sending a Registration Claim with a Software Statement

9.3. About authentication and authorization mechanisms for DCR and DCM services

9.3.2. Client Maintenance - GET /register - PUT /register - DELETE /register

9.4. Signature certificates validation

Author's Address